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I. INTRODUCTION
Special purpose acquisition companies (“SPACs”) raised $87.9 billion
in the United States over the first three months of 2021. 1 Completely
unused for a decade after being invented by a lawyer and banker duo in
1993, SPACs surpassed the traditional initial public offering (“IPO”) in
2021 as a vehicle for private companies to be listed on the public stock
exchange (or “go public”) and raise capital.2 When a private company
merges with a publicly-listed SPAC, the successor company formed from
the merger retains the benefits of the SPAC’s public listing.3 High-profile
companies that have gone public by merging with a SPAC include
DraftKings, Virgin Galactic, Nikola Motor Co., WeWork, 4 23andMe, and
* Publications Editor, University of Cincinnati Law Review. I wish to thank Professor of Law Lynn Bai
for her thoughtful guidance and my Notes and Comments Editor Carter Ostrowski for his diligent review
of drafts of this Comment. Any views expressed herein are my own.
1. Yun Li, SPACs Break 2020 Record in Just 3 Months, But the Red-Hot Industry Faces
Challenges Ahead, CNBC (Mar. 19, 2021, 10:34 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/19/spacs-break2020-record-in-just-3-months.html [https://perma.cc/8GSK-KMRZ].
2. See U.S. SEC, OFF. INV. EDUC. & ADVOC., WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT SPACS –
UPDATED INVESTOR BULLETIN (2021) [hereinafter WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT SPACS]; Frank
Holmes, What Are SPACs, and Why Is Everyone Talking About Them Right Now?, FORBES (Mar. 22,
2021, 12:54 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2021/03/22/what-are-spacs-and-whyis-everyone-talking-about-them-right-now [https://perma.cc/2Y69-FQFP].
3. See EVA SU, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11655, SPAC IPO: BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES 1
(2021).
4. Tom Huddleston, Jr., What Is a SPAC? Explaining One of Wall Street’s Hottest Trends, CNBC
(Jan.
30,
2021,
9:00
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/30/what-is-a-spac.html
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BuzzFeed.5 Significantly fewer companies used SPACs to go public in
the first quarter of 2022 than in the year before, but the future of SPAC
usage remains uncertain.6
A SPAC raises funds through an IPO in order to facilitate the SPAC’s
merger with a target entity, typically a private company.7 By merging with
a SPAC, a private company can become a publicly-listed company
without navigating the traditional IPO process. 8 In recent years, business
sector experts have criticized the lengthy and onerous process that
accompanies the IPO.9 SPACs offer a legal workaround to the IPO, taking
a private company public while avoiding the perceived delays and
inefficiencies of the IPO.10
SPACs are sometimes referred to as blank check companies or shell
companies because they typically make few expenditures before merging
with a private company.11 Once a SPAC has raised funds through an IPO,
the funds are placed in an escrow account managed by a third party until
the SPAC merges with a target company or liquidates. 12 SPACs typically
employ no administrative staff, purchase no physical office space, and
make no capital investments.13 Instead, a SPAC’s management team,
frequently comprised of the SPAC’s founders and sponsors, leads the
initiative to identify and merge with a target company.14 The management
[https://perma.cc/R8US-RYSC].
5. David Reichenberg, Ready, Set, SPAC: Who Is Winning in This Latest Investment Trend?,
FORBES (Sept. 5, 2021, 10:38 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidreichenberg/2021/09/05/readyset-spac-who-is-winning-in-this-latest-investment-trend [https://perma.cc/6SPP-87NE]. See also Jessica
Bursztynsky & Alex Sherman, BuzzFeed Shares Close Down 11% on First Day of Trading After SPAC
Merger, CNBC (Dec. 6, 2021, 11:08 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/06/buzzfeed-stock-fallssurge-on-first-day-of-trading-after-spac-merger.html [https://perma.cc/F237-ZRV9].
6. Preston Brewer, Analysis: Days of Future SPAC—How SPACs Might Be ReWorked,
BLOOMBERG L. (June 15, 2022, 5:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-lawanalysis/analysis-days-of-future-spac-how-spacs-might-be-reworked [https://perma.cc/N7HQ-3BSG].
SPAC registrations sunk from 299 in the first quarter of 2021 to just 18 in the first quarter of 2022. Id.
7. SU, supra note 3, at 1.
8. Max H. Bazerman & Paresh Patel, SPACs: What You Need to Know, HARV. BUS. REV., July–
Aug. 2021, https://hbr.org/2021/07/spacs-what-you-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/TA9N-3Z5Z].
9. Dave Erickson, What’s Wrong with the IPO Process and How to Fix It, KNOWLEDGE
WHARTON (Dec. 15, 2020), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/whats-wrong-ipo-process-fix
[https://perma.cc/98ZM-4UKQ]. See also A.C. Pritchard, Revisiting “Truth in Securities” Revisited:
Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing Private Markets in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 999, 101314 (2013).
10. Jonathan Baer, The Slow Death of the Traditional IPO, NETWORK: BUS. BERKELEY L. (Oct.
3, 2020, 8:59 AM), https://sites.law.berkeley.edu/thenetwork/2020/10/03/the-slow-death-of-thetraditional-ipo [https://perma.cc/EDG4-H2XU].
11. WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT SPACS, supra note 2.
12. How Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) Work, PWC, https://www.pwc.com/
us/en/services/audit-assurance/accounting-advisory/spac-merger.html [https://perma.cc/S9WK-NMMU]
(last visited Dec. 3, 2021).
13. See WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT SPACS, supra note 2.
14. Id.
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team may have a specific target company in mind or focus on a narrow
group of target companies that share a common business purpose. 15
Because the identity of a SPAC’s target company is not shared outside
the management team, prospective SPAC investors rely on the reputation
of the management team to judge the SPAC’s suitability for investment. 16
Each SPAC has a two-year time limit to complete the merger or risk
liquidation, which returns the SPAC’s IPO proceeds to investors.17
The sizeable influx of capital into SPACs has been accompanied by
accelerating scrutiny from regulators and commentators. Congress, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), 18 have expressed concerns
about the risks SPACs pose for small investors, individual investors who
purchase small quantities of stocks.19 In recent years, some investors have
filed class action lawsuits against SPACs, alleging that SPACs
misrepresented facts that influenced investors’ decision making.20
In August 2021, billionaire investor Bill Ackman’s SPAC,
Pershing Square Tontine Holdings, Ltd. (“PSTH”), was named in the
most high-profile lawsuit involving SPACs to date, a shareholder
derivative suit filed in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York.21 PSTH was the largest SPAC to have gone public
at the time.22 The plaintiff was a shareholder in PSTH who argued in his
complaint that PSTH qualified as an investment company under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (“ICA”).23 By failing to accurately
register PSTH as an investment company, the plaintiff alleged, PSTH was

15. Id.
16. Investing in a SPAC, FINRA (Mar. 29, 2021), https://www.finra.org/investors/insights/spacs
[https://perma.cc/QG43-ZPWW].
17. See WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT SPACS, supra note 2. Some SPACs elect for an
eighteen-month duration instead. Id.
18. About FINRA, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/about [https://perma.cc/4TND-7B3B] (last
visited Nov. 18, 2021). FINRA is a private non-governmental organization authorized by Congress to
oversee broker-dealer activity in the United States. Id.
19. See Corey I. Rogoff, FINRA Lives up to Its Name, Announces Regulatory Inquiries into
SPACs, 11 NAT’L L. REV. 207 (2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/finra-lives-to-its-nameannounces-regulatory-inquiries-spacs [https://perma.cc/F5NL-3J4F]; Gary Gensler, Chairman, SEC,
Prepared Remarks Before the Small Business Capital Formation Advisory Committee (Sept. 27, 2021).
20. See WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT SPACS, supra note 2.
21. Yun Li, Bill Ackman SPAC Sued, Plaintiffs Say Directors Were Promised ‘Staggering
Compensation’, CNBC (Aug. 17, 2021, 10:10 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/17/bill-ackmanspac-sued-plaintiffs-say-directors-were-promised-staggering-compensation.html [https://perma.cc/JG43Y2FG].
22. Complaint at 1–2, Assad v. Pershing Square Tontine Holdings, Ltd., No. 21-cv-06907
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2022) [hereinafter Assad Complaint].
23. Id.; see also Li, supra note 20. The plaintiff was represented pro hac vice by New York
University Law Professor Robert Jackson, Jr., and Yale Law School Professor John Morley. Id.
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structured to illegally extract millions of dollars from investors.24
Regardless of whether PSTH was improperly structured, the litigation
presented the intriguing and consequential question: whether a SPAC
should properly be classified as an investment company under the ICA.25
This Comment examines and addresses the main question presented by
the complaint filed against PSTH: whether SPACs constitute investment
companies under the ICA.26 Investment companies are subject to filing
requirements and operating restrictions that do not apply to other
companies.27 Part II of this Comment provides a brief history of SPACs,
from invention to contemporary prevalence. Then, Part II continues with
an overview of the circumstances and debates that preceded the adoption
of the ICA, an analysis of the ICA’s text, and one court’s effort to bring
clarity to that text. Part III evaluates positions for and against regulating
SPACs as investment companies under the ICA. Ultimately, Part III
argues that SPACs do not fit within the legal framework set up by the
ICA, as evidenced by the ICA’s text and Congress’ legislative intent. Part
III proposes solutions to the legal and economic quandaries involving
SPACs that do not require regulating SPACs as investment companies.
Part IV concludes this Comment by asserting that legislative action is
preferable to judicial reinterpretation where SPACs are concerned,
critiquing contemporary congressional repudiation of the power to
legislate.
II. BACKGROUND
The operations and prevalence of SPACs have changed considerably
since the company type was initially invented. A holistic consideration of
how SPACs and the ICA were created, evolved in usage, and are likely to
be used in the future is required to understand how SPACs might fit into
the ICA’s framework. Accordingly, Section A of this Part describes the
history of SPACs, from unused in the 1990s to gaining popularity in the
2010s. Section A next describes the SPAC boom of 2020 to 2021, during
which SPAC issuance surpassed traditional IPOs, and the recent

24. See Assad Complaint, supra note 22.
25. Before the court could settle the matter, PSTH dissolved in July 2022 without selecting and
merging with a target company, returning the $4 billion raised to shareholders. Tom Zanki, Ackman to
Dissolve Massive $4B SPAC, Refund Investors, LAW360 (July 12, 2022, 5:01 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1510739/ackman-to-dissolve-massive-4b-spac-refund-investors
[https://perma.cc/883Y-89DR]. Accordingly, the shareholder plaintiff dismissed his lawsuit against
PSTH. Elaine Briseño, Pershing Square Investor Drops Suit over SPAC Status, LAW360 (July 13, 2022,
2:38 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1511141/pershing-square-investor-drops-suit-over-spacstatus [https://perma.cc/U4GH-DR9V].
26. See Assad Complaint, supra note 22.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 109–15.
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regulatory crackdown on SPACs. Section B details the historical
circumstances that precipitated the ICA’s enactment in 1940 to illuminate
the drafters’ intentions. Section B then describes the principles of
legislative intent behind the ICA, gleaned from congressional debates and
hearings, to consider whether these principles support the inclusion of
SPACs within the ICA’s framework. Section C identifies the most
relevant portions of the ICA’s definition of an investment company, as
codified in the United States Code. Finally, Section C of this Part
describes one case from the limited case law on the ICA that clarifies the
definition of an investment company. This analysis facilitates later
evaluation of whether and where SPACs fit within the ICA’s scope.
A. The Evolution of SPACs
SPACs were invented in 1993 by banker David Nussbaum and lawyer
David Miller to give startups an alternative route by which to raise funds
from individual investors.28 At the time, the SEC was concerned about the
proliferation of fraud in the corporate securities sector, especially penny
stock fraud. 29 Investment brokers had been fraudulently selling penny
stocks (corporate stocks sold for less than five dollars) to investors
targeted as unlikely to research the stocks before investing.30
The year before SPACs were invented, the SEC adopted a regulation
building on the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) to crack
down on blank check companies, entities frequently compared or equated
with SPACs.31 The SEC defined a blank check company as a company
with “no specific business plan or purpose or [which] has indicated its
business plan is to engage in a merger or acquisition with an unidentified
company or companies, or other entity or person.”32 Accordingly, in the
regulation adopted, the SEC defined a blank check company to include a
company whose (1) “business plan is to engage in a merger or acquisition
with an unidentified company” and (2) who is “issuing ‘penny stock,’ as
28. Amrith Ramkumar, SPAC Pioneers Reap the Rewards After Waiting Nearly 30 Years, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2021, 4:53 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/they-created-the-spac-in-1993-now-theyrereaping-the-rewards-11615285801 [https://perma.cc/GYN2-725L].
29. O. Dennis Hernandez, Jr., Broker-Dealer Regulation Under the New Penny Stock Disclosure
Rules: An Appraisal, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 27, 30–32 (1993). The SEC is still concerned about the
fraudulent sale of penny stocks today. See e.g., Microcap Fraud, INVESTOR.GOV,
https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/spotlight/microcap-fraud [https://perma.cc/85TB-96U4]
(last visited Sept. 2, 2022).
30. Edward G. Lance, IV, SEC Cracks Down on Penny-Stock Fraud, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
9, 9–10 (1998). See also THE WOLF OF WALL STREET (Paramount Pictures 2013) for an entertaining,
semi-fictional illustration of the functioning of a penny stock boiler room.
31. 17 C.F.R. § 230.419 (2021). See WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT SPACS, supra note 2.
32. NASD Regulation, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, [1993–2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,681 (Jan. 21, 2000).
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defined in Rule 3a51-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934” (the
“Exchange Act”). 33 In the SEC’s view, blank check companies present a
special risk of fraud and manipulation in the penny stock market, which
harms investor confidence and jeopardizes the stability of the blank check
company as an entity type.34 Given the SEC’s emphasis on investor
protection and fraud reduction, Nussbaum and Miller worked with
regulators when inventing SPACs to ensure these regulatory priorities
were satisfied in the structure of SPACs. 35 Disclosure requirements for
SPACs were increased as a result of these discussions.36
For a decade after the invention of SPACs in 1993, the SPAC structure
went unused.37 The first SPAC went public in the United States in 2003.38
In the early days of SPAC formation, boutique law firms and investment
banks sometimes supported SPAC sponsor groups which chose target
companies in specialized industries.39 Thirty-three SPACs went public
over the years 2015 and 2016.40 The New York Stock Exchange listed its
first SPAC in May 2017.41 In 2019, SPACs accounted for one-fourth of
all IPOs for the year, as more experienced investors became SPAC
sponsors and pursued target companies in a wider variety of market
sectors.42
A “SPAC boom” began in 2020, when SPAC IPOs exceeded
traditional IPOs for the first time.43 During the first quarter of 2021,

33. 17 C.F.R. § 230.419 (2022). Rule 3a51-1 defines penny stock according to what it is not,
excluding stock issued by a registered investment company, puts (rights to sell a stock), call options (rights
to buy a stock), and most stocks sold for more than five dollars, among others. Id. § 240.3a51-1.
34. NASD Regulation, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, [1993–2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,681 (Jan. 21, 2000).
35. See Ramkumar, supra note 28.
36. Id. At this time, Nussbaum and Miller also added “the right for a SPAC’s investors to get their
money back before [the] merger with a private company goes through” to the SPAC structure. Id.
37. Camila Domonoske, The Spectacular Rise of SPACs: The Backwards IPO That’s Taking over
Wall Street, NPR (Dec. 29, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/12/29/949257672/thespectacular-rise-of-spacs-the-backwards-ipo-thats-taking-over-wall-street
[https://perma.cc/YS9CQAAT].
38. Brandon Schumacher, A New Development in Private Equity: The Rise and Progression of
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies in Europe and Asia, 40 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 391, 404 (2020).
The first European SPACs to go public did so in 2005. Of course, European SPACs face a different set of
regulatory guidelines and stock exchange requirements than SPACs in the United States. Id. at 404–05.
39. Bazerman & Patel, supra note 8.
40. Mark Stricherz, SPACs Overtake IPOs as Preferred Vehicle for Companies Going Public, CQ
ROLL CALL, Mar. 5, 2021, 2021 WL 836857.
41. Holmes, supra note 2.
42. Nicholas Jasinski, 2019 Was a Record Year for ‘Blank-Check’ Companies. Here Are the
Biggest Trends., BARRON’S (Feb. 6, 2020, 2:13 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/2019-was-arecord-year-for-blank-check-companies-here-are-the-biggest-trends-51581016401
[https://perma.cc/Y32D-72FK].
43. See Holmes, supra note 2.
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SPACs made up 68.5 percent of all IPOs in the United States.44 Observers
continue to debate the causal factors behind the sudden uptick in the
popularity of SPACs, but some scholars noted that many startup firms had
high demand for access to capital at a pre-revenue point in the business
life cycle that was not satisfiable through the traditional IPO process. 45
Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic brought investor uncertainty and
market volatility, which highlighted the risks of the IPO and led
experienced, high-profile investors who were previously SPAC-hesitant
to view SPACs as a viable alternative to the IPO.46
Amid this proliferation of SPACs, noteworthy instances of SPAC
mismanagement dampened some investors’ excitement. In March 2020,
Nikola Corporation (“Nikola”), an American electronic automobile
manufacturing company, publicly announced the intention to go public
by merging with the publicly-traded SPAC VectoIQ Acquisition Corp.47
After the merger, Nikola soared to a market capitalization of over $30
billion, at the time surpassing automotive industry titan Ford Motor
Company’s valuation.48 However, in September 2020, a short seller
released an online report alleging that Nikola’s founder and executive
chairman Trevor Milton had made fraudulent statements about Nikola’s
proprietary technology and ability to produce gases required for the
electronic automobiles’ fuel cells.49 An internal review of the company
conducted by an outside law firm confirmed some of the short seller’s

44. Anne Sraders, Months After the SPAC Boom, Returns Have Been ‘Weak,’ Says Goldman
Sachs, FORTUNE (Sept. 16, 2021, 3:11 PM), https://fortune.com/2021/09/16/spac-returns-ipos-goldmansachs [https://perma.cc/N92N-9C5X].
45. Why
SPACs
Are
Booming,
KNOWLEDGE
WHARTON
(May
4,
2021),
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/why-spacs-are-booming
[https://perma.cc/36WV-34J2].
The traditional IPO process is more favorable for companies at later stages of development than startup
companies. Id.; see also Jessica Bai et al., Segmented Going-Public Markets and the Demand for SPACs
14–15 (Sept. 23, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/angelama/files/bai_ma
_zheng_sep2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQS3-ZW98].
46. Crystal Tse & Crystal Kim, SPACs Were Hot in 2020 and Are Hotter Now. Here’s Why,
BLOOMBERG PRO. SERVS. (Apr. 23, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/spacs-werehot-in-2020-and-are-hotter-now-heres-why [https://perma.cc/92J9-B6A9].
47. Abhishek Manikandan, Nikola Corp to Go Public at over $3.3 Billion Valuation, REUTERS
(Mar. 3, 2020, 7:23 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nikola-corp-vectoiq/nikola-corp-to-gopublic-at-over-3-3-billion-valuation-idUSKBN20Q1J5 [https://perma.cc/U37N-VNUP].
48. Ben Foldy, Electric-Truck Startup Nikola Bolts Past Ford in Market Value, WALL ST. J. (June
9, 2020, 10:50 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/electric-truck-startup-nikola-bolts-past-ford-inmarket-value-11591730357 [https://perma.cc/Z7Y9-E64J].
49. Nikola: How to Parlay an Ocean of Lies into a Partnership with the Largest Auto OEM in
America, HINDENBURG RSCH. (Sept. 10, 2020), https://hindenburgresearch.com/nikola [https://perma.cc/
WGB3-3JGY].
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claims.50 Milton resigned from the company the same month.51 Soon
after, the SEC sued Milton for violating the anti-fraud provisions of the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act, seeking a permanent injunction,
civil penalties, and disgorgement of Milton’s gains from his alleged
misconduct.52
In 2021, as larger private companies increasingly chose to go public by
SPAC merger rather than by traditional IPO, regulatory oversight of
SPAC activity rose commensurately. In May 2021, the United States
House Committee on Financial Services released draft legislation that
would amend the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, changing the
definition of a blank check company to include “a development stage
company that . . . has indicated that its business plan is to acquire or merge
with an unidentified company, entity, or person,” language describing
SPACs’ business model.53 By defining companies that operate like
SPACs as blank check companies, the legislation would eliminate
SPACs’ safe harbor protections from lawsuits related to forward-looking
statements, such as financial projections, opening SPACs up to increased
risks of liability from misrepresentation claims.54
In July 2021, the SEC filed charges against another SPAC, Stable Road
Acquisition Company (“Stable Road”), Stable Road’s chief executive
officer (“CEO”), and the target company for Stable Road's merger. 55
Stable Road, its CEO, and the target company settled with the SEC for
over $8 million.56 The same month, the president and CEO of FINRA
announced that the organization planned to intensify scrutiny of SPACs,
given the risks for mismanagement and misrepresentation by SPAC
managers. 57 In September 2021, SEC Chairman Gary Gensler expressed
50. Ben Foldy, Nikola Internal Review Confirms Some Claims in Short Seller’s Report, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 26, 2021, 9:47 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nikola-internal-review-confirms-some-claimsin-short-sellers-report-11614350745 [https://perma.cc/26DE-2K9V].
51. Corey I. Rogoff, Ex-Nikola Chairman Indicted for Securities Fraud, 11 NAT’L L. REV. 242
(2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ex-nikola-chairman-indicted-securities-fraud [https://per
ma.cc/RC4T-AVLB].
52. Brief for Plaintiff at 64–65, SEC v. Milton, No. 21-cv-06445 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2021).
53. H.R. __, 117th Cong. (2021), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/5.24_bills117pih-hr____.pdf [https://perma.cc/55VR-TFLW] (discussion draft legislation).
54. Ran Ben-Tzur & Jay Pomerantz, House Releases Draft Legislation Eliminating SPAC Safe
Harbor for Forward Looking Statements, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 7, 2021),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/06/07/house-releases-draft-legislation-eliminating-spac-safeharbor-for-forward-looking-statements [https://perma.cc/8Y8F-8LCX]. Losing safe harbor protections
would likely compel SPAC management to take out additional directors and officers liability insurance to
cover the resulting increased risk of litigation, an additional cost for affected SPACs to bear. Id.
55. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges SPAC, Sponsor, Merger Target, and CEOs for Misleading
Disclosures Ahead of Proposed Business Combination (July 13, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2021-124 [https://perma.cc/4QPH-R6FK].
56. Id.
57. Rogoff, supra note 19.
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concern that some SPACs’ practice of raising funds from private
investments in public equity (transactions in which an issuer sells stocks
to an investor at a discount from market rates) could be benefiting large
institutional investors at the expense of small retail investors, in effect
diluting the small retail investors’ shares. 58 Chairman Gensler
recommended increased disclosure requirements for SPACs to address
this potential dilution and ensure investor protection.59
B. Adoption of the ICA
Several decades before SPACs were invented, the American stock
market crash of October 1929 marked the beginning of the Great
Depression.60 By June 1932, the value of the Dow Jones Industrial
Average had fallen approximately two-hundred points from three years
earlier. 61 When some banks failed, many Americans lost deposited life
savings.62 Unemployment rose to a rate of 23.6 percent in 1932.63
Businessmen who had previously made money selling stocks began to
sell investment advice instead.64 Amid this economic disruption, an SEC
investigation into investment sector practices discovered a pattern of
abuses by investment advisers and investment company managers against
the interests of the individual investors they served.65
In response, Congress drafted and passed the ICA and the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (“IAA”) as companion legislation to rein in these
seemingly nefarious investment advisers.66 Over the year preceding the
passage of the ICA and IAA, Congress held committee and subcommittee
hearings, received letters from the SEC, and issued reports to formulate
an effective response to the ongoing problems in the country’s investment
sector.67 Congressional documents from this period present the objectives

58. Gensler, supra note 19.
59. Gary Gensler, Chairman, SEC, Prepared Remarks Before the Investor Advisory Committee
(Sept. 9, 2021).
60. John D. Harkrider, Lessons from the Great Depression, 23 ANTITRUST 6, 6–7 (2009). The
Great Depression was a period of worldwide economic decline. Id.
61. Id.
62. Americans React to the Great Depression, LIBR. CONG., https://www.loc.gov/classroommaterials/united-states-history-primary-source-timeline/great-depression-and-world-war-ii-19291945/americans-react-to-great-depression [https://perma.cc/2T82-95AK] (last visited Oct. 9, 2022).
63. See Harkrider, supra note 60, at 6.
64. Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 65
BUS. LAW. 395, 402–03 (2010).
65. 87 CONG. REC. 9815 (1940).
66. 75th Anniversary of the 1940 Acts, U.S. SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/75th-anniversaryiac-ica.shtml [https://perma.cc/W3RC-HKTZ] (last visited Oct. 10, 2022). The ICA and IAA are
frequently referred to jointly as the “1940 Acts.”
67. 87 CONG. REC. 9807–08 (1940); H.R. DOC. NO. 70 (1939); H.R. DOC. NO. 707 (1938).
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that motivated Congress to enact the ICA: (1) curbing the behavior of selfinterested investment company managers; (2) protecting small investors;
(3) reducing investment companies’ misrepresentations; and (4) restoring
the public reputation of the investment company, all without
handicapping the investment sector.
First, the ICA was adopted to stop investment company managers from
operating investment companies to further self-interest at investors’
expense. 68 Congress sought to counter the abusive business practices the
SEC investigation into investment companies uncovered. 69 For instance,
some investment company managers withdrew funds for personal use
from investment companies they managed and failed to return the funds.70
Other managers arranged economically unsound loans and bailouts from
investment company funds, unnecessarily disadvantaging investors.71 By
enacting the ICA, Congress sought to crack down on the investor-harming
behavior of these self-aggrandizing investment company managers.
Second, the ICA was adopted to protect small investors. 72 In 1940,
investment companies were fundamental to the national economy and
enjoyed a broad appeal among members of the public. 73 Between 1927
and 1936, around one-fifth of all sales of corporate securities were by
investment companies to members of the public.74 Shares in investment
companies were sometimes purchased by low-income individuals
through installment plans, and protecting this vulnerable population from
abuse was a special concern for Congress.75 Congress found that investors
were having difficulty gathering enough information about investment
companies, especially those that had not registered securities, and hoped
that passing the ICA would increase the amount of information that
investment companies disclosed.76
Third, the ICA was adopted to police investment companies’ public
misrepresentations.77 The ICA provides that an investment company is
barred from making misrepresentations in the documents the company
files with the SEC and from using a misleading company name when
registering as an investment company with the SEC.78 The SEC’s
68. 87 CONG. REC. 9807.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 10072.
71. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on
Banking & Currency, 76th Cong. 37, 285 (1940) [hereinafter Investment Trusts].
72. 87 CONG. REC. 9815.
73. Id. at 10072.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 10071.
76. Id. at 10073.
77. Id. at 10077.
78. Id. at 9813.
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investigation discovered that one investment company sold shares to lowincome individuals by convincing the individuals that money invested
was being put into a savings plan.79 Other low-income individuals were
persuaded that funds invested in the investment company could be
retrieved at any time, like a bank account.80
Fourth, the ICA was adopted to restore the beleaguered public
reputation of investment companies.81 Between 1929 and 1940, small
investors in investment companies had experienced significant losses.82
Members of Congress considered what proportion of these losses was due
to the overall decline in the value of stocks over that period and what
proportion was due to mismanagement of investment companies by
investment company managers. 83 Regardless, reputational damage to
investment companies had solidified.84 Congress hoped the ICA would
rebuild small investors’ confidence in investment companies, which in
turn would stimulate capital flow into the investment sector and mitigate
the economic downturn the country was experiencing. 85 Congress
predicted that the ICA’s protections would encourage venture capital
investment in investment companies.86
Simultaneously, Congress sought to establish these protections without
unduly handicapping the investment sector.87 One member of Congress
who spoke during the congressional debate over early versions of the ICA
emphasized that the bill should be crafted in a manner that would not
discourage investment activity.88 While supporting the investigation into
improper conduct related to investment companies, the congressman
expressed the “need . . . [for] the removal of every unnecessary handicap
to business, whether of governmental or economic character” to support
the economic wellbeing of the country, seemingly an aim to draft the ICA
without burdensome overinclusiveness.89
C. The ICA’s Definition of an Investment Company
The ICA has remained largely unchanged since initial enactment in

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Investment Trusts, supra note 71, at 42–43.
Id. at 168.
87 CONG. REC. 9808, 9815.
Id. at 10072.
Id. at 9815.
Id.
Id. at 9807.
Id. at 9808.
Id. at 9815.
Id. at 9816.
Id.
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1940, notwithstanding being amended by Congress in 1970. 90 The portion
of the ICA defining “investment company” for the purposes of the statute
is codified in Title 15, Section 80a-3, of the United States Code.91
Subsection (a) includes generally applicable definitions for entities that
qualify as investment companies.92 Subsections (b) and (c) provide an
extensive list of exemptions for entities that would otherwise be
considered investment companies under subsection (a). 93 Throughout, the
statute emphasizes that an entity’s primary business purpose is a main
determinant of whether the entity is an investment company.94
Under subparagraph (a)(1)(A), an investment company is an entity that
“is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage
primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in
securities.”95 Subparagraph (a)(1)(B) provides that face-amount
certificate companies are investment companies. 96 Subparagraph
(a)(1)(C) establishes that entities whose business involves or plans to
involve “investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities,”
and who own or plan to own “investment securities” (securities purchased
as an investment) with a value greater than forty percent of the entity’s
value in total assets, are investment companies.97 The forty percent rule
excludes cash and government securities (such as government bonds and
treasury notes) from the entity’s total asset value.98 Paragraph (b)(1)
makes clear that an entity “primarily engaged . . . in a business or
businesses other than that of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or
trading in securities” is not an investment company for the purposes of
the ICA.99
Next, Section 80a-4 divides investment companies into three
categories: (1) face-amount certificate companies; (2) unit investment
trusts; and (3) management companies. 100 Face-amount certificate
companies raise money by issuing debt securities to investors. 101 Unit
90. See Gerard H. Manges, The Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 – An Analysis and
Appraisal After Two Years, 14 B.C. L. REV. 387 (1973).
91. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-3 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 117-179).
92. Id. § 80a-3(a).
93. Id. §§ 80a-3(b)–(c).
94. Id. § 80a-3.
95. Id. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A).
96. Id. § 80a-3(a)(1)(B).
97. Id. § 80a-3(a)(1)(C).
98. Id.
99. Id. § 80a-3(b)(1).
100. Id. § 80a-4.
101. Id. Face-amount certificate companies are also mentioned in Section 80a-3, subparagraph
(a)(2). Id. See Face Amount Certificate Company: Everything You Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL,
https://www.upcounsel.com/face-amount-certificate-company [https://perma.cc/P4LF-Q6LM] (last
visited Dec. 3, 2021).
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investment trusts raise money by buying a group of securities, often
stocks and bonds, and offering them to investors as redeemable units for
a set time period.102 The ICA designates all investment companies that do
not qualify as face-amount certificate companies or unit investment trusts
as management companies.103 Management company managers decide
what the company will invest in.104
Additionally, SEC Chief Counsel David Schenker described, at a
Senate subcommittee hearing on the ICA, two subclassifications of
management companies that fall within the ICA’s regime: (1) open-end
management companies; and (2) closed-end management companies.105
Investors in open-end management companies have the right to compel
the company to redeem (buy back) the investor’s shares. 106 Investors in
closed-end management companies, in contrast, do not have the right to
compel the company to redeem shares. 107 Beyond these categorizations,
Schenker noted that management investment companies were
subclassified with an eye to the structure of the company and the “nature
of [the company’s] activities,” (i.e., what the company does with the
money received from investors).108
The metrics used to determine what constitutes an investment company
are consequential because a company deemed an investment company
must register as such with the SEC.109 Should SPACs be categorized as
investment companies, they would need to satisfy investment company
registration requirements. Registration as an investment company
requires disclosure of company information, including the company’s
investment policies and statements on the company’s plans to borrow
money, buy and sell real estate, and make loans.110 The ICA imposes
extensive restrictions on registered investment companies, limiting how
the companies may name themselves,111 the classes of securities the
companies may offer,112 the process by which the companies may choose
an accountant113 or adviser,114 and the penalties that apply to those who
102. Unit Investment Trusts (UITs), INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introductioninvesting/investing-basics/glossary/unit-investment-trusts-uits [https://perma.cc/NJ8U-HB3A] (last
visited Oct. 10, 2022).
103. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-4(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 117-179).
104. Investment Trusts, supra note 71, at 186.
105. Id. at 186–87.
106. Id. at 43.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 186–87.
109. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-8 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 117-179).
110. Id.
111. Id. § 80a-34.
112. Id. § 80a-18.
113. Id. § 80a-31.
114. Id. § 80a-15.
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steal from the companies.115 Registered investment companies are also
subject to regulations that build on the ICA, which include requirements
that certain types of investment companies provide periodic reports to
investors and list certain information in sales literature. 116
Over the decades since the ICA’s enactment, courts have attempted to
clarify ambiguities in the ICA’s definition of an investment company,
expounding on when a company is “engaged primarily, or proposes to
engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in
securities.”117 SPACs were invented relatively recently, so post-ICA
enactment case law does not focus on SPACs. Nonetheless, analyzing
courts’ application of the ICA to comparable non-SPAC companies
proves informative.
In SEC v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc., the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York endeavored to identify what
constitutes an investment company under the ICA’s definition.118 The
City of New York had acquired a bus company, Fifth Avenue Coach
Lines, Inc. (“Fifth”), through condemnation.119 At the condemnation
proceeding, Fifth sought remuneration for property taken by the city,
triggering a flurry of litigation.120 The SEC brought an action for
injunction against Fifth based on Section 42(e) of the ICA.121 Section
42(e) permits the SEC, upon uncovering a violation of a subchapter of the
ICA or associated regulations, to “bring an action in a United States
district court to seek . . . a civil penalty to be paid by the person who
committed such violation.”122
Discovery uncovered a web of misbehavior on the part of Fifth
executives. 123 In 1962, Fifth borrowed $9 million (valued at the time of
writing at approximately $88 million) to satisfy the company’s financial
obligations, including debts, judgments from personal injury claims
related to operation of the buses, and former employees’ pensions. 124
Then, Fifth stopped all business practices, reduced its staff to a handful of
employees whose sole job was to eliminate tort claims against the
company, and sold its office space to instead work out of the second floor

115. Id. § 80a-36.
116. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.34b-1, 270.30e-1 (2021).
117. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-3(a) (emphasis added).
118. SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3, 26–29 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
119. Id. at 9.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 7–8.
122. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-41(e). Section 42(e) also permits the SEC to bring such a suit in response
to the violation of an SEC cease-and-desist order. Id.
123. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. at 41.
124. Id. at 10.
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of a garage in a suburb of the city.125
The SEC’s complaint against Fifth hinged on the allegation that Fifth
operated as an investment company, as defined in the ICA, without
properly registering as an investment company with the SEC.126 To
determine whether Fifth was an investment company, the court
considered what constituted Fifth’s primary business when Fifth began to
spend accumulated company funds.127 Fifth spent most of the funds
purchasing stock in other companies to gain control of those companies,
while minimally operating buses on the side.128 The court, noting that the
ICA does not define the term “invest” for the purposes of the legislation,
set out to clarify the meaning.129 According to the court, “[t]hat word must
be given its normal meaning, i.e., to put out money at risk in the hope of
gain. . . . Those who seek control obviously do so in the hope of ultimate
gain.”130 Acknowledging the legislative intention behind the ICA to stem
the abuses of investment company managers who oversaw large pools of
funds, the court held that Fifth’s spending of company funds to gain
control of other companies was the sort of conduct Congress intended to
be regulated under the ICA.131 Thus, Fifth erred in failing to register as an
investment company.132 In sum, the court emphasized that a primary
business purpose of buying and selling stocks in hope of profit indicates
that a company is likely an investment company for the ICA’s
purposes.133
III. DISCUSSION
SPACs do not fit within the ICA’s definition of investment companies
because a SPAC’s primary business purpose is completing a merger, not
dealing in stocks. Furthermore, regulating SPACs as investment
companies would not serve the congressional intentions behind the ICA.
Fortunately, legitimate concerns about SPACs can be addressed without
requiring SPACs to register as investment companies. Accordingly,
Section A of this Part argues against the inclusion of SPACs as investment
companies, asserting that SPACs do not fit within the ICA’s definition of
investment companies and that mandating otherwise would contradict the

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 29–30.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ICA’s legislative principles. Section B argues that, nonetheless, SPACrelated misconduct and SPACs’ insider trading risks justify heightened
regulatory scrutiny. Section C of this Part posits solutions to the problems
with SPACs: congressional investigation into SPAC-related
misrepresentations, congressional promotion of a regulatory environment
that encourages small and young companies to go public, and heightened
disclosure requirements for SPACs.
A. SPACs Are Not Investment Companies Under the ICA
The typical SPACs formed or conceivably likely to be formed do not
fit within the definition of investment company provided in Title 15,
Sections 80a-3 and 80a-4. Unlike other company types, such as mutual
funds, SPACs do not usually “engage[] primarily . . . in the business of
investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities.”134 That is, a SPAC’s
primary business purpose is not dealing in securities. A SPAC does not
typically sell face-amount certificates, invest in or hold securities equal to
more than forty percent of the SPAC’s value in total assets, or have
management choose an entity in which to invest.135 These primary
business purposes exhaust the list that would give rise to classification as
an investment company.136
Case law affirms this interpretation. In SEC v. Fifth Avenue Coach
Lines, Inc., where the district court classified the company in question as
an investment company, that company’s primary business was investing
in other companies’ stocks to gain control of those companies.137 In
contrast, a SPAC’s primary business purpose is to select and merge with
a target company within a specified, limited duration.138 Standard
language for a SPAC’s prospectus (a disclosure document companies file
with the SEC) states that the SPAC is “a newly incorporated blank check
company formed for the purpose of effecting a merger, capital stock
exchange, asset acquisition, stock purchase, reorganization or similar
business combination.”139 A SPAC has the ability to purchase stocks, but
SPAC investment in stocks during the process of selecting and merging
with a target company is incidental to the primary business purpose of the
merger. Under the ICA, a company “primarily engaged . . . in a business
. . . other than that of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
2020).

15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 117-179).
See supra text accompanying notes 100–04.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 131–32.
See supra text accompanying notes 7, 17.
Churchill Capital Corp III, Amendment to Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) (Feb. 12,
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in securities” is not an investment company. 140 Selecting and merging
with a target company is a separate primary business purpose from
dealing in securities, so a SPAC is not an investment company.
Moreover, SPACs are not a logical fit amongst the ICA’s
subclassifications of investment companies. Consider the three types of
investment companies listed under Section 80a-4: face-amount certificate
companies, unit investment trusts, and management companies. 141 SPACs
do not qualify as face-amount certificate companies or unit investment
trusts because SPACs neither sell face-amount certificates nor raise funds
by buying groups of securities and offering them to investors as
redeemable units.142 The only subclassification remaining is the
management company, but SPACs do not fit within this category.
Compare a SPAC to the prototypical Section 80a-4 management
company, the mutual fund. Both SPACs and mutual funds file
prospectuses and pool funds from investors, but similarities end there.143
A SPAC takes investors’ pooled funds and places the funds in escrow, per
SEC regulations, where the funds must remain until the SPAC’s merger
with a target company has completed or the SPAC has liquidated.144 In
the case of a SPAC liquidation, in which a SPAC does not complete a
merger within the approved period, each SPAC investor receives his or
her pro rata share of the escrow. 145 Mutual funds, in contrast, take the
investors’ pooled funds and invest them in securities.146 Unlike SPACs,
mutual funds have no requirement to set a date by which they must
complete some task or risk liquidation.147 Both open-end and closed-end
mutual funds, with the primary business purpose to invest pooled investor
funds into securities, fit comfortably within the management company
subclassification of investment companies.148 SPACs, however, do not as
a rule invest pooled investor funds in securities. 149 Accordingly, SPACs

140. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-4 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 117-179).
141. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 100–04.
142. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-4.
143. Mutual Funds, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investingbasics/investment-products/mutual-funds-and-exchange-traded-1 [https://perma.cc/F3NS-DJXN] (last
visited Nov. 18, 2021).
144. FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE NO. 08-54, GUIDANCE ON SPECIAL
PURPOSE ACQUISITION COMPANIES (2021).
145. Id.
146. See Mutual Funds, supra note 143.
147. Id.
148. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-4 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 117-179).
149. See Ramey Layne & Brenda Lenahan, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies: An
Introduction,
HARV.
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(July
6,
2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/07/06/special-purpose-acquisition-companies-an-introduction
[https://perma.cc/VGJ6-32R2] (describing how SPACs typically keep funds raised from an IPO in a trust
account).
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are not management companies within Section 80a-4’s definition.150
Small investors in SPACs are adequately protected under the existing
regulatory regime, so regulating SPACs as investment companies under
the ICA is not required to ensure investor protection. Given that SPACs
go public without announcing a target company or having a lengthy
business history to consider, investors widely understand that SPACs are
a riskier investment than other company types.151 Helpfully, a prolific
educational campaign on behalf of federal government agencies has
instructed the public about the risks and rewards of SPACs.152 A SPAC
must also disclose information upon going public that helps potential
investors decide whether to buy shares.153 While small investors were
defrauded into buying investment company shares prior to the ICA,154
SPAC investors are predominantly large institutional investors who are
aware of the risk-and-reward calculus involved with SPAC investment.155
Furthermore, retail investor ownership of SPAC stocks is
“minimal.”156 Investors in a SPAC retain a degree of control over that
SPAC’s trajectory. Once a SPAC has selected and announced a merger
with a target company, that SPAC’s investors must vote to approve the
merger or the merger cannot proceed. 157 SPAC investors have the
freedom to vote down the merger and compel the SPAC to buy back their
shares.158 Since SPAC investors can exert these levers of control, small
investors in SPACs are less vulnerable to SPAC mismanagement than
were small investors in investment companies before the ICA. Therefore,
the investor protection concerns prior to 1940 that motivated the ICA’s
enactment are not analogous to the conditions that small investors in
SPACs experience today.
Contrary to the legislative intention behind the ICA to restore the
public reputation of investment companies, the public perception of
SPACs needs no boost.159 Even though SPAC IPO frequency has been
volatile in recent years, SPACs have been generally well-received by

150. Id.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 11–17.
152. See FIN. INDUS. REGUL. AUTH., supra note 144.
153. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-8 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 117-179).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 79–80.
155. Nothing But the Facts: Retail Investors and Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, COMM.
ON
CAP.
MKTS.
REGUL.
(Oct.
19,
2021),
https://www.capmktsreg.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/10/CCMR-NBTF-SPACs-Retail-Investors.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VKM-UHYY].
156. Id. (“[T]he entire SPAC lifecycle, from SPAC IPO to merging with a private company, consists
of initial investments by institutional investors with little (if any) involvement from retail investors.”).
157. See How Special Acquisition Companies (SPACs) Work, supra note 12.
158. Id.
159. See 8 CONG. REC. 9808, 9815.
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investors.160 Some commentators apprehensively viewed SPACs’ uptick
in popularity as a bubble set to burst.161 Certainly, some investors in
SPACs expressed disappointment with the rate of return on initial
investment.162 However, these critiques of SPACs are moderate and
measured compared to the damaged reputation that investment companies
endured prior to the ICA’s enactment. At that time, investment companies
were publicly perceived to be run by fraudsters, and that reputation seems
at least partially deserved in retrospect.163 By 2022, SPACs’ popularity as
a vehicle for going public had dropped from the heights of the SPAC
boom, but this drop was not accompanied by the wholesale public
skepticism that had been directed toward investment companies. 164
Regulating SPACs under the ICA’s framework is not needed to
rehabilitate SPACs’ reputation because, unlike investment companies in
the 1940s, SPACs have not been repudiated by the public.165
B. SPACs Present Unique Risks That Justify Regulatory Scrutiny
Even though SPACs do not fit neatly into the ICA regime, some
concerns about SPACs justify regulatory scrutiny. The incidence of highprofile misrepresentations by executives connected to SPACs warrants
investigation, just as the misrepresentations by investment company
managers did prior to the ICA. Between January 1 and August 1, 2021,
twenty-one of the twenty-two securities class action suits filed against
160. See Why SPACs Are Booming, supra note 45.
161. Ivana Naumovska, The SPAC Bubble Is About to Burst, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 18, 2021),
https://hbr.org/2021/02/the-spac-bubble-is-about-to-burst [https://perma.cc/W9MV-DRZG].
162. See Amrith Ramkumar, SPAC Selloff Bruises Individual Investors, WALL ST. J. (May 19,
2021, 9:32 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/spac-selloff-bruises-individual-investors-11621396808
[https://perma.cc/99GM-YW88].
163. See supra text accompanying notes 79–80.
164. Jemima McEvoy, Take Back the SPAC: More and More Companies Are Canceling HighProfile Deals to Go Public, FORBES (Dec. 22, 2021, 12:36 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jemim
amcevoy/2021/12/22/take-back-the-spac-more-and-more-companies-are-canceling-high-profile-dealsto-go-public [https://perma.cc/SZE9-RDXS]. Observers have debated the reasons behind the precipitous
drop in SPAC issuance from 2021 to early 2022. Posited factors include (1) rising inflation; (2) a mismatch
in the ratio of SPACs to desirable target companies; and (3) investor concerns about increasing regulatory
scrutiny of SPACs. See Once Wall Street’s Darling, SPACs Fall from Favor, MD. SMITH: SMITH BRAIN
TR. (May 20, 2021), https://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/research/once-wall-streets-darling-spacs-fall-favor
[https://perma.cc/U44K-S2RT]; Matthew Goldstein, SPACs Were All the Rage. Now, Not So Much., N.Y.
TIMES (June 2, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/02/business/spacs-inflation-regulation.html
[https://perma.cc/L9ZM-KK4J].
165. The decline of SPAC IPOs in early 2022 was accompanied by a simultaneous decline in the
traditional IPO market. Accordingly, the drop-off in SPAC IPOs may reflect macroeconomic conditions,
not investors’ rejection of SPACs in particular. See Noah Higgins-Dunn, The IPO Market Went from
‘Boom to Bust’ in 2022. Here’s What’s Driving the Massive Slowdown, CNBC (Sept. 23, 2022, 1:34 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/23/stock-market-ipos-went-from-boom-to-bust-in-2022.html
[https://perma.cc/YFJ2-ML2U].
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SPACs in the United States included Rule 10b-5 claims, alleging that
individuals involved with SPACs made “untrue statements, misleading
statements, or omissions regarding material facts connected to the
purchase or sale of securities.”166 The SEC’s suit against SPAC Stable
Road alleged that the CEO of Stable Road’s target company had made
misrepresentative claims about the target company’s technology.167 The
SEC alleged the same of Trevor Milton, the erstwhile CEO of Nikola,
which was SPAC VectoIQ Acquisition Corp’s target company. 168
According to SEC Chairman Gary Gensler, the short-term profitability of
SPAC mergers sometimes causes SPAC management teams to fail to
conduct adequate due diligence (factual investigations into a company,
typically involving review of financial statements) on merger target
company candidates under the belief that a thorough due diligence
process would delay the merger and, thus, delay the profits for the
SPAC’s management team and investors. 169 The accumulation of
misrepresentations resembles a trend, which should be addressed.
By nature, SPACs lack an evaluable business history, which creates an
investment risk for investors. The pooled funds a SPAC raises from
investors essentially present a blank check for the SPAC management
team.170 SPAC investors cannot know or predict with certainty the
identity of the SPAC’s target company for the merger. The target
company’s secret identity is a main determinant of whether investment in
that SPAC will be profitable over time.171 Accordingly, investors must
judge the remunerative prospects of a SPAC by the reputation of the
management team, attempting to estimate how effectively the managers
will select a suitable target company and carry out the merger. 172 SPACs’
lack of an extensive record of business successes and failures to evaluate
increases the vulnerability of SPAC investors.
Beyond this, SPACs inherently involve an insider trading risk. For
most of a SPAC’s life cycle, the management team keeps the identities of
probable merger candidates secret. Should a SPAC investor learn the
secret identity of a publicly-listed SPAC’s target company, trading stocks
in that SPAC based on that knowledge presumably contravenes insider

166. Roger E. Barton, Caution Ahead: SPAC Litigation Trends Provide a Road Map for Directors
and Officers, REUTERS (Sept. 2, 2021, 12:38 PM), https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/cautionahead-spac-litigation-trends-provide-road-map-directors-officers-2021-09-02 [https://perma.cc/6JKCYAG4].
167. Press Release, supra note 55.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 49–52.
169. Press Release, supra note 55.
170. See Bazerman & Patel, supra note 8.
171. Investing in a SPAC, supra note 16.
172. Id.
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trading laws.173 Each new SPAC involves a consequential secret, the
identity of the likely target company, so regulators have good reason to
scrutinize SPACs’ insider trading risks.
C. Solving the Problems with SPACs
Rather than judicially shoehorn SPACs into regulation under the ICA
by stretching the definition of an investment company beyond logic,
Congress should investigate the high-profile instances of misconduct by
SPAC management teams and SPAC target company executives.
Furthermore, Congress should enact legislation that specifically addresses
foreseeable problems with SPACs related to misrepresentations.
Congress followed a similar process to address self-interested investment
company manager behavior, establishing a suitable blueprint to address
the contemporary concerns raised by SPACs.174 If the issue of inadequate
investor protection for SPAC investors has a sufficiently urgent national
character to necessitate intervention, the matter should be addressed by
congressional inquiry and legislative action, not a judge’s reinterpretation
of a statute enacted in 1940 to curb Great Depression-era investment
sector abuses.
Furthermore, the inefficiencies perceived to be permeating the IPO
process that have driven investors to revive a decades-old, long-neglected
company structure rather than pursue a traditional IPO should be
examined. Especially during periods of economic instability, such as the
challenges the United States endured due to the COVID-19 pandemic,
Congress should take initiative to promote innovation and economic
flourishing in the country’s investment sector. If contemporary IPO
requirements have become a bottleneck that dissuades private companies
from pursuing IPOs, Congress should take steps to promote new entrants
to the stock exchange without compromising the protections that
encourage investors to participate.175 Small-to-mid market sector
companies who seek to go public via SPAC due to burdensome IPO
requirements should not be shut out of the public exchange by regulating
SPACs into economic non-viability based on an imaginative legal
interpretation of the definition of an investment company.
173. Glenn Kopp et al., Mitigating SPAC Enforcement and Litigation Risks, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 18, 2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/05/18/mitigating-spacenforcement-and-litigation-risks [https://perma.cc/AC8X-FSAB] (“It is just a matter of time before the
SEC . . . bring[s] an insider trading case related to a SPAC transaction in which insiders trade ahead of a
transaction or are the source for a tippee who trades on material non-public information.”).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 68–71.
175. To be clear, making any changes to the IPO rules governed by the Securities Act would be
extremely complicated, risky, and controversial. Congress is likely better prepared to serve the interests
of the public through legislative action of another sort.
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Due to SPACs’ manager-focused structure, the disclosure requirements
for information about the individuals who make up SPAC management
teams should be rigorous. When disclosures about the business
background of SPAC managers and sponsors are accurate and detailed,
prospective investors in SPACs will be better informed and protected. 176
Indeed, the SEC has proposed strengthening disclosure requirements for
SPACs, citing the concern that inaccurate disclosures from SPACs may
be misleading SPAC investors.177
IV. CONCLUSION
A SPAC is not an investment company under the ICA because a
SPAC’s primary business purpose is to merge with a target company, not
to invest in or hold stocks. Congress adopted the ICA in 1940 to protect
small investors in investment companies who were being defrauded by
self-interested investment company managers, but small investors are not
systemically harmed by SPACs. Most investors in SPACs are
sophisticated institutional investors who are aware of the risks of
investing in shell companies like SPACs. Imposing burdensome
regulatory rules and restrictions for SPACs would impede the main
vehicle that took companies public in recent years of market volatility.
However, even though SPACs are not investment companies, SPACs
present risks for investors that should be addressed. An apparent pattern
of misrepresentations by SPAC management teams and target company
executives has emerged, potentially incentivized by SPACs’ structure.
The target company for a SPAC’s merger must be kept secret among the
SPAC managers, and this consequential secret gives each SPAC a unique
insider trading risk compared to other company types. 178 By the middle
of 2022, commentators widely agreed that the SPAC boom had ended,179
176. But see Tamar Frankel, The Failure of Investor Protection by Disclosure, 81 U. CIN. L. REV.
421, 435–38 (2013) (arguing disclosure statements do not effectively protect investors because they are
too complex and go unread).
177. Greg Iacurci, SEC Is Scrutinizing SPAC Projections, Seeks Clearer Disclosures, CNBC (Apr.
30, 2021, 5:37 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/09/sec-is-scrutinizing-spac-projections-seeksclearer-disclosures.html [https://perma.cc/GP5B-K6EN].
178. See Alex Wyman et al., SPAC-Related Enforcement and Litigation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Apr. 13, 2022), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/04/13/spac-related-enforcementand-litigation-what-to-expect-in-2022 [https://perma.cc/DH34-9SZ2] (“Information that [a] SPAC is
pursuing a business combination agreement with a target, before that agreement is announced, could
constitute material non-public information . . . . [T]rading in the SPAC based on that information could
be considered insider trading.”).
179. Bansari Mayur Kamdar & Medha Singh, SPAC Boom Fizzles as Investors Cash Out on Big
Names, REUTERS (Dec. 31, 2021, 6:37 AM), https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/spac-boomfizzles-investors-cash-out-big-names-2021-12-17 [https://perma.cc/CN6M-ZHUK]; see also Ortenca
Aliaj et al., SPAC Boom Dies as Wary Investors Retreat, FIN. TIMES (June 9, 2022),
https://www.ft.com/content/2a560343-69eb-4e36-9833-cc579a7dc8ad [https://perma.cc/J3HF-Z2KD];
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and Bill Ackman’s massive SPAC PSTH dissolved without selecting a
target company, so many investors seemed to have decided that SPACs’
inherent risks outweigh the potential rewards. 180
Market efficiency and investor protection should be balanced, such that
neither aim is abandoned. Congress is the supreme lawmaking body in
the United States, though Congress has at times abdicated the power to
legislate.181 However, as recently as 2012, Congress passed the Jumpstart
Our Business Startups Act, which eased securities regulations for smaller
companies and led to a rise in the number of companies to go public over
the years that followed.182 Congress should overcome internal divisions
and return to the legislative function to continue to support the success of
small and young companies, investigate SPAC and target company
misrepresentations, and heighten disclosure requirements for SPACs.

Bailey Lipschultz & Katherine Burton, SPAC Era Comes to a Whimpering End as Wall of Redemption
Nears, BLOOMBERG L. (June 24, 2022, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/
securities-law/XFHQIVQ0000000?bna_news_filter=securities-law#jcite [https://perma.cc/85BP-79QF].
180. See Zanki, supra note 24.
181. Derek Willis et al., How Congress Stopped Working, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 5, 2018, 10:00 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-congress-stopped-workin [https://perma.cc/GNV6-72AC].
182. Michael J. Zeidel, The JOBS Act: Did It Accomplish Its Goals?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (July 18, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/07/18/the-jobs-act-did-itaccomplish-its-goal [https://perma.cc/MW2X-CKZS].
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